

**THIS COPY IS NOT
FOR RELEASE.**

CIA files on these persons were requested and reviewed by HSCA staff members.

W

their contact with the defector to the Agency. (Grand
Dawson
Author
20000s.) One file reg. a former
military person ~~who defected~~^{contains a deferring} report of a debriefing conducted by mil. intell. (See,
an
1 of the remaining 4 files. was

4-6
[Diagram showing a rectangular frame with a central vertical column and horizontal lines extending from the top and bottom edges. The text 'in complete notes file' is written across the bottom of the frame.]

Rice. : int. in info
in several areas

W.E.S.

The circumstances of the Agency's contact w/ the 4 remaining informants were diff. in each case. One of the defectors was [unwittingly] interviewed [by a CIA officer in the Am. Emb.
in [Copenhagen]] upon his departure from the S.U. en route to the U.S. While L's file indicates
that the Agency considered a full & controlled debriefing by the CIA & FBI to be
conducted in Angleton, note to the FBI suggesting a joint debriefing, there is no
evidence in L's 201 file nor any ACD doc. which suggest further contact on the part
of the CIA.

One of the individual's ~~was never recorded by the CIA~~ ^{was actually born during} ~~cross-reference~~ reflects that he had actually been living in the USSR since 1933 ^{returned to the} ~~was released~~ U.S. in 1962, ^{and} ~~was recruited by~~ ^{recruited by} CIA officer after applying for employment in response to a newspaper advertisement. (Rev. of liaison file.)

Court debuffings were conducted of the other two defa. Pkt. E. Webster, the highly
suspect with ^{were defective apparently} the Read Rev. (exp. in 1959) was highly publicized, was in

More extensive debriefings were conducted of the other 2 defcs. Rbt. E. Webster, a plastics expert with the Reed Div. (4pp. whose defection to the S.U. in 1959 was highly publicized, ret. to the U.S. in 6/62. In ^{Sixty, thereafter, component} 1962 subsequently w/in the Agency conducted a debriefing of Webster in his home territory. Webster had been employed in the S.U. at the Kirovograd Scientific Inst. of Polyolefin Plastics.



Donald Deenely
worked

(This fact was corroborated by another CIA employee who worked in the FBI in the Sov. branch of the Directorate of Intelligence in 1962 told the HSCA that he specifically recalled collecting intelligence info. regarding the Minsk Radio Plant. In fact, Deenely claims that, during the summer of 1962, he reviewed a contact report from interview ^{interviewing} rep. from the CIA's N.Y. field office, who interviewed a former Marine who had also worked at the Minsk Radio Plant following his defection to the USSR. This person who Deenely believes may have been Lee Oswald had been living w/ his family in Minsk. Deenely advised the Committee that the contact report was filed in a volume concerning the Minsk Radio Plant which should be retrievable from the Industrial Registry Branch which, in 1962, was a component of the DDC.

The HSCA requested ^{made a request to the} CIA to the CIA. The HSCA requested that the CIA provide the Committee ~~the~~ above-described contact report & the vol. of materials concerning the Minsk Radio Plant. ^(admin/10) ~~the file~~ ^{letter} The CIA provided a review of the docs. in the volume in the M.R.P. indicated that no such file existed. The CIA provided the volume of regarding the M.R.P., but no contact report existed in that file. (DCC). The file review did indicate that in 1975, Daniel Schorr had made a similar request ^{to get back} ~~as info offered to him for Deenely~~ for Deenely. It was informed by the CIA that no ^{such report} existed.

If the 29 persons requested, our office did not have a file for me under ^{the Ag. was not able to locate} ~~in the case~~ of 6 other indivs., the file review did not indicate that they were not.

22

The HSCA succeeded.

The HSCA After prep. files on ²⁹ indivs. who fit the above-described criteria ^{the CIA} were provided files on ²⁰ of the ²⁹ 28 indivs. on whom they maintained records. ^{Both} 20 files were reviewed as ^{well as any existing} DDC files ^{for} regarding those indivs. In the case of 6 indivs., there is no indication in their files that they were returned to the U.S. Even so, there were occasional reports from sources who observed or spoke w/ these persons while in the S.U., but there is no indication of direct contact w/ them by the CIA.

19 4

In regard to the other 22 defectors, ^{the file review indicates that} there is no record of direct CIA contact w/ 18 of them. Again, some of these files contain a report from a source who reported

It becomes clear from the review of files on these defs. that debriefing of defectors was in fact somewhat of a random occurrence. However, in the instances ~~where~~ ^{in which} the Ag. did choose to debrief returning Am. def., the Ag. ^{was} ~~appeared~~ ^{was} interested to be interested in ~~various~~ topics of general interest ^{regarding} U.S. life. Life is certain

of the Sov. U. In this regard, 90 — Where are you.

The persons who were debriefed were similar to the fact that they left at or before the same general time period, and spent their time in the S.U. in areas of interest to the CIA.

More ext. deb. were conducted of the other 2 defs. R.L. W., a plastics expert w/c. A.C. whose deb. to the S.U. in 1959 was highly publicized, 1st. to the U.S. in 6/63.

W had been employed in the S.U. at the ~~the~~ Soviet Inst. of Polytech. Plastics.

Shortly after his return, W was debriefed in his home territory by ~~etc.~~ ^{etc.} from DO/C, SR/6 & the A.F. It was decided that a more ext. debriefing was in order in W was subseq. brought to the Washington where he was deb. for a period of 2 wks.

The deb. reports incl. a chron. of W's life & the CIA's access of him as well as a log. of info. regarding life in the S.U., W's work there & being info. on persons he had met during his residence there.

Ref. 7/59
Rev. 6/25/63

Similarly, Vito Cimarelli who had lived in the S.U. for nearly 4 yrs., was selected for purposes of debriefing shortly after his ret. to the U.S. in late June of 1963. His initial debriefing included such subjs. as his motivation to defect to USSR as well as activities engaged in during Moscow stay, relocation from Moscow to Kiev & general aspects of life such as residence costs & costs. While the Ag. felt that they would be interested in eliciting more info. ^{on such topics} re: life in the S.U. as cost of living, med. care, consumer goods, highway/highways, transport, restrictions w/in Kiev.

While the CIA felt it was unfeasible to debrief R more thoroughly due to his current status of trying to regain U.S. cit.,

Ag. ftth

1622-1125-B : Index cards

#1623-1125-C Dated 30 Oct. 1975

Discusses letters intercepted

States that copies of intercepted letters were passed to FBI in course of normal exchange of intelligence. Substance doesn't relate to JFL excess.

"The records examined to date do not disclose whether or not this information was made avail. to the N.C. by the FBI or CIA."

Vol. 5 608-256-C

Copies of letters ^{written by LHO to requester}, forwarded to CIA by letter dated 17 March 1964
from J. Lee Rankin, U.C. of N.C. & R. Helms, ADP

Ratio - questions

Gen. Backgd.

Att. file on LHO items

Index cards

HSCA question

Agency response

#1

I CIA statements to H.C. (#988-927-B.D) ^{testimony}, #1038-405-B, affidavit
info provided W.C. Insert for CT Staff History
#1063-964-B, #1073-964-L)

II CIA statements to ~~Leitner~~ (#961, 962, 969, 970)

CIA statements to HSCA; D.C.B.

III T.B.C. memo & interview (#435-173-A)
[#3369]

IV Defectors

M.K. (#1004-400)
S.O.P. - DCB

V G.R.B. request

#609
#610

VI ~~Scope of A.D.M.~~ See #1188-1000 p.3

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#618-673

609-786

610-263

1188-1000

1004-400

1187-

Hock - Rock. Comm.